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Multifunctional buildings have become more common in the last years. At the same time the threat from
antagonistic attacks has increased. This presents challenges for the fire safety systems in multifunctional buildings
since continuity of functions, especially those considered to be of societal importance, need to be operational and
at the same time antagonistic exposures may present more challenging fire scenarios. A method for selection and
evaluation of fire related scenarios in multifunctional buildings, that also considers antagonistic attacks, has been
developed. Based on literature review and interviews with stakeholders typical for a multifunctional building,
specific problem areas that the developed method needed to take into account were identified. A first framework
for development of fire scenarios, developed by the authors in previous work, was refined taking into account the
identified problem areas resulting in the method described in this article. The method, still simple to use, provides
guidance on how to determine assets needing protection, relevant protection objectives, exposures (both
accidental and antagonistic), fire related scenarios and evaluation of scenarios. The method also takes into account
the inherent probability of failure for active systems, security features, domino effects and damage to protection
systems due to antagonistic attacks.
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Multipurpose buildingIntroduction
Multifunctional buildings, for terminology see Appendix,
are characterized by the multiple social or commercial
functions or occupancies located within a building or
interconnected buildings. There is a trend when designing
new buildings to locate many functions or occupancies
within one building rather than designing several single
purpose buildings as has been done previously. Almost
every major city has one or more buildings that may be
characterized as multifunctional, e.g. hosting theatres, a
subway-station, a shopping center, restaurants, offices and/
or hotels within the same building. These buildings are
often open to the public hosting a variety of businesses and
tenants as well as a large number of visitors. Often areas
within these buildings host important societal functions
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in any medium, provided the original work is pof these factors contribute to the overall complexity,
vulnerability and potentially unacceptable consequences
to society if an incident was to occur. An incident in
such a building may result in significant consequences
as a result of death, property damage and impaired
functions that may be essential to societal and/or business
operations.
During the last decades terrorism and physical attacks on
buildings have continued to increase (Brown and Lowe 2003)
adding to the overall complexity and vulnerability for
multifunctional buildings. Nilsson et al. (2012) conclude
that the likelihood of an antagonistic attack is in the same
order of magnitude, for some buildings, as is deemed to be
unacceptable by some recommendations, and antagonistic
attacks can therefore not be ignored. Det Norske Veritas
(Davidsson et al. 1997) for example has suggested risk
criteria for individual risk between 10-5 and 10-7 and
between 10-4 and 10-6 per year for N = 1 with a slope of −1
for societal risk and Stewart (2008) suggests that thean Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly cited.
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is between 10-6 and 10-7. In addition, arson should also be
considered as an antagonistic attack and is a relatively
common event. Richards (2008) suggests that 15% of all
fires in New Zealand are deliberately lit and for public
buildings (retail shopping, cinemas etc.) this may be as
high as 40%. Hall (2007) concluded that 6% of all fires
in the US are intentional and Simonson (2007) states
that at least 25% of all fires in Sweden are intentional.
Some examples of antagonistic attacks that can be
mentioned include; the subway arson fire in Korea 2003
(National Emergency Management Agency 2004), the
underground explosion in the UK 2005 (Handley et al. 2009),
the explosion in the World Trade Center 1993 (Isner and
Klem 1993), the gas attack on the subway in Japan 1995
(Pangi 2002) and the bombings in Boston, USA, 2013
(Winter et al. 2013). Since multifunctional buildings host a
large number of people, critical functions important to soci-
ety and may be considered iconic buildings or historically
significant etc. they are more likely to be selected as tar-
gets for antagonistic attacks. This is due to the fact that
such an attack is likely to inflict significant emotional and/
or economic damage as well as impairment to societally
important functions (Brown and Lowe 2003). Further, an-
tagonistic attacks have the potential to cause a long-term
effect on society, beyond the physical damage and inter-
ruption of services. As an example, Rubin et al. (2007)
concluded that the population had reduced their use of
the public transportation system within the London area
8 months after the London bombings in 2005 by 19% and
Handley et al. (2009) conclude that 45% of persons dir-
ectly affected by the bombings reported disabling travel
anxiety that had interfered with their everyday life. In
addition when considering antagonistic attacks these can
be considered catastrophic with a high potential of large
fires. These large fires are perceived as less acceptable than
ordinary fires (Wolski et al. 2000). Wolski et al. (2000)
further state that the high-rise fire risk is perceived as
catastrophic compared to for example the single-family
home building fire. A high-rise fire can be compared to
multifunctional buildings as they also are generally large
and have a potential for catastrophic events. Wolski et al.
(2000) discuss nine risk factors: volition; severity; effect
manifestation; familiarity; controllability; benefit; necessity;
exposure pattern and origin, that can be used to describe
why people require a higher or lower safety level. Many
of these factors point towards a required higher safety
level in multifunctional buildings, especially if antagonistic
exposure exists.
Traditional fire safety design, to obtain code compliance,
focuses on life safety considering accidental fire events
(Klason et al. 2011) and limited consideration is given to
property protection and continuity of functions. Further
scenarios incorporating antagonistic events are generallynot considered by the building code (Gilbert et al. 2003)
and the traditional prescriptive design generally does not
account for arson fires since it does not consider the
actions of the individual lighting the fire (Richards 2008,
Klason et al. 2011). Due to the fact that antagonistic events
can be more severe and carefully planned there is a
potential for larger consequences, especially if such attacks
have not been taken into account at the design phase.
Antagonistic attacks, as seen in the above examples, can
differ widely and it may be hard to define such a scenario.
However, in multifunctional buildings, there is also a
potential that other protection objectives than simply
life safety are present, e.g. continuity of functions and
protection of property that is generally not considered by
building codes.
The large number of multifunctional buildings, where
not only life safety is of concern but also continuity of
operations and functions, and the increased threat for
antagonistic attacks create a demand for a method analyzing
the fire safety level from a holistic view. Such a method
needs to incorporate life safety with regards to accidental
fires as well as other protection objectives (e.g. continuity
of functions, property, cultural heritage) and the possibility
of antagonistic events. Most building codes are reliant on
prescriptive rules, however these rules are inflexible if not
applied to a historically traditional building (Frantzich 1998).
Multifunctional buildings are by definition not traditional
buildings even though the number has increased, hence a
holistic method needs to be performance-based since such
a method defines protection objectives to be achieved
(Frantzich 1998) and there is a possibility to consider a
large variety of scenarios. Such a method includes the
management of hazards more severe than usually as-
sumed for life safety design, fire spread prevention etc. in
the current building codes.
A holistic method, for selection and evaluation of fire
related scenarios in multifunctional buildings considering
antagonistic attacks, must incorporate a selection of fire
related scenarios that need to be analyzed and evaluated.
Due to the wide variety of possible antagonistic attacks
the method also needs to incorporate a structure to be
able to determine relevant antagonistic threats and how
such scenarios may develop, i.e. initiating event, possible
domino effects etc. Although antagonistic attacks might
include a much greater scope than simply fire related
attacks, the aim of this method is to evaluate fire related
scenarios and will therefore not include antagonistic
attacks such as gas attacks, cyber attacks etc., however
some parts of the method may be applicable for exposures
other than fire. The defined scenarios must then challenge
the protection objectives and be chosen based on an ana-
lysis of possible exposures. Finally an evaluation procedure,
as to whether the protection objectives are met or not,
needs to be specified. In summary such a method must:
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etc. (hereon called assets) need to be protected.
2. State clearly protection objectives for these assets.
3. Evaluate what exposures or threats (including
antagonistic exposures) may cause the protection
objectives not to be met.
4. Incorporate a selection of scenarios based on
protection objectives and exposures.
5. Evaluate whether the protection objectives are met
or not for the scenarios.
Goal, purpose and working process
The goal is to present a method for selection and evaluation
of fire related scenarios in existing multifunctional buildings
that also considers fire related antagonistic attacks. The
working process to develop such a method is presented
in Figure 1. The method should identify assets, relevant
protection objectives and exposures, including fire related
antagonistic exposures. Further it should incorporate the
selection and quantification of fire related scenarios that
may pose a threat to the protection objectives not being
met. Finally, the method then needs to evaluate whether
the protection objectives are met or not for the selected
scenarios. The purpose of the method is to support
prevention of fire related accidents and consequence
mitigation in case of fire related accidents in multifunctional
buildings, incorporating a variety of relevant protection
objectives as well as fire related antagonistic events. The
















Figure 1 Working process.buildings, however parts of the method may also be
applicable for new designs.
To develop the method the work was divided into four
steps, represented by the four boxes in Figure 1. Two
steps (step 1 and 3) comprised problem identification
to support development of the method and two steps
(step 2 and 4) comprised development of the method itself.
The problem identification steps had two problem
focus areas for multifunctional buildings. The first was
problems associated with multifunctionality can include
a large number of tenants, variety of different functions,
different occupancies etc. The second problem area was
associated with antagonistic events, e.g. larger initiating
events, degree of planning etc.
In step 1 (part of problem identification), a literature
review was conducted which resulted in a first framework
for development of fire scenarios in multifunctional
buildings, i.e. step 2 (part of development of the method).
This first framework and the conclusions from the litera-
ture review are described in Nilsson et al. (2012), however
the main conclusions regarding problem areas are summa-
rized below. The main focus of the literature review was
identification of problems connected to multifunctionality
and antagonistic events that the method needs to con-
sider. The literature review also comprised a review on
performance-based fire design guidelines to give input on
possible evaluation procedures for multifunctional build-
ings. Overall, the literature reviewed included the following:
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design guidelines regarding antagonistic attacks; review of
occurred antagonistic attacks and their implications.
In step 3 (part of problem identification), interviews
with stakeholders in a selected multifunctional building
were conducted. The selected building’s main purpose
was infrastructure (transport center) but the building also
hosted a large variety of other businesses and functions. A
total of nine interviews were conducted with different
business owners, rescue services, the safety management
team, etc. The interviews were semi-structured, which
gave the benefit of ensuring flexibility in how and in what
sequence questions are asked, for the interviewees to be
able to develop their thoughts and for the interviewer to
be able to ask follow-up questions so that unexpected
themes could emerge (Mason 2004). The aim of the
interviews was to identify additional problems with
respect to multifunctionality and antagonistic events
that the stakeholders in multifunctional buildings are
dealing with. Further, an understanding of how different
stakeholders are working with these additional problems
as well as protection against antagonistic attacks and their
view on such exposures was also sought. In addition
questions were asked to support refinement of the first
framework for development of fire scenarios presented
in Nilsson et al. (2012). An interview guide was created
based on the purpose with the interview. The full descrip-
tion and findings of the interviews can be found in Nilsson
and van Hees (2012), however the main conclusions are
summarized in the following section. Additionally, an
extended literature review was conducted on information
obtained and deemed relevant during the interview process.
The first framework developed in step 2 (part of develop-
ment of the method) and presented in Nilsson et al. (2012)
was to some extent based on the SFPE engineering guides
(SFPE 2006, 2007), however with several modifications.
Based on the information from the interviews and the
extended literature review in step 3 (part of problem
identification) a refinement of the first framework
(developed in step 2 (part of development of the method))
was done in step 4 (part of development of the method).
Step 4 (part of development of the method) resulted in
the final method for selection and evaluation of fire
related scenarios in multifunctional buildings considering
antagonistic attacks. The method is presented in the
following sections, however, first the results from step 1–3
are presented.
Problem identification to support development
of method
Below are the results from the problem identification
presented, starting with the literature review and then the
interviews. Finally remarks and a summary are presented
on aspects that need to be considered within the method.Literature review
The literature review was conducted using Web of Science
search engine for peer-reviewed papers. An extended
search was also conducted to find appropriate standards,
dissertations etc. The results are presented below.
Stakeholders
The nature of multifunctional buildings is to gather many
different occupancies and businesses in one building. This
results in the fact that there are many different functions
provided and that there are many different stakeholders
having interests in the building. One identified problem
area in Nilsson et al. (2012) is that these stakeholders can
have very different views on what needs to be protected
resulting in a large variety of protection objectives or goals
that needs to be accounted for. For some stakeholders fire
safety might not be of primary concern while as others
cannot accept an interruption to the functions they provide
in case of fire. There might also be interdependencies
causing problems further down the line warranting a
higher safety level and the protection objectives might
be considerably different from what the building code
generally addresses (Nilsson et al. 2012).
Fire protection systems
Multifunctional buildings often incorporate a variety of
different protection systems such as; active fire protection,
e.g. sprinkler system, gaseous extinguishing systems and
smoke evacuation, and passive fire protection; e.g. fire
compartmentation and space separation. Building codes
often focus on minimizing damage to third party by
requiring fire protection systems such as physical separation
or fire barriers between different occupancies within a
multifunctional building and between different buildings.
In reviewing previous real-life antagonistic attacks and
their consequences it was noted that there is a tendency
for protection systems to become impaired or not to
function as expected during the course of an antagonistic
event. This is especially true for antagonistic events involv-
ing explosions or highly energetic initiating events which
may result in physical separation or fire barriers as well
as the installed active protection being inadequate or
damaged due to the initiating event. As an example the
bombing of the World Trade Center (WTC), 1993, can
be mentioned, where the fire alarm communication system
(control center) was lost so that occupants did not get
evacuation information, and masonry fire walls and fire
doors were voided by the force of the explosion (Isner and
Klem 1993). Normal and emergency electrical power was
lost affecting sprinkler system as well as emergency lighting
(Isner and Klem 1993) and the smoke management system
was damaged (Quenemoen et al. 1996). The situation
where a single failure (in this case electricity) is disabling
several protection systems is often referred to as common-
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following sections. Other examples, where protection
systems have been lost are; the arson fire in Gothenburg
where the fire started in an evacuation route impairing
its function (Eksborg et al. 2001) and the attack on
WTC, 2001, where the structural fire protection was
damaged by the plane crash (Gutierrez et al. 2005).
Other issues with antagonistic attacks may be that fire
protection is bypassed, there is the potential for multiple
fires to be ignited which the protection cannot handle or
the severity of the fire is too challenging for the protection
(Richards 2008). Thompson and Bank (2007) also points
out the importance of attacks on fire suppression systems
and attacks against evacuation routes. Since a successful
outcome of a fire often is dependent upon the effectiveness
of the protection systems, special consideration is needed
when considering antagonistic attacks. The potential for
domino effects where the initiating event escalates, e.g. an
explosion followed by a fire where the protection system
is affected during the event, is pointed out in Nilsson et al.
(2012) and needs to be incorporated in the analysis. Not
only do these examples indicate the importance of the
protection systems but also supporting systems such as
electricity, i.e. damaging support systems could impair
the protection system. This is analogous to important
functions as well in case they are dependent upon support
systems.
In addition it may also be the case that the protection
system is not effective in achieving the protection objective,
e.g. if an electrical room is of critical importance and the
room is protected by sprinklers. In this case soot, heat etc.
may cause too much damage to some of the electrical
components before the system activates, even though the
fire is controlled and does not spread outside the room
(Nilsson et al. 2012).
Fire size and location
If a fire is started as part of an antagonistic attack flammable
liquids or explosives may be used and in this case the
fire development could potentially be accelerated when
compared to that of an accidental cause (Richards 2008).
This will have an impact on both life safety and other
protection objectives. Generally buildings are not designed
for arson fires, which is supported by the consequences
related to the fire in Gothenburg (Eksborg et al. 2001) as
well as the subway fire in Korea (National Emergency
Management Agency 2004) with a large number of fatalities.
In terms of multifunctionality there may also be sensitive
equipment, support systems or rooms of special import-
ance where even a small fire could cause large damage.
Such small fires are generally not considered due to their
limited effect on life safety, however these fires might be
of great importance in terms of continuity of businesses
and/or functions (Nilsson et al. 2012).Both in terms of continuity of functions as well as
antagonistic attacks the location of the fire is of great
importance, a well-informed attacker might know exactly
where to place the attack to achieve the most damage. An
accidental fire at an unfortunate location might cause
large consequences in terms of interruption to a function.
The location of the fire therefore needs to be considered
in the light of what is supposed to be protected (Nilsson
et al. 2012). Unusual locations, i.e. fire locations not
normally analyzed, might therefore need to be considered,
for example; in sensitive areas or external facades which is
a common starting area for arson fires (Klason et al. 2010).Security and the aggressor
When reviewing design guidelines for protection against
terror attacks and antagonist attacks such as Brown and
Lowe (2003), it becomes clear that one of the main
protection features against antagonistic attacks are security
measures. Security includes surveillance, site perimeter
protection, access control etc. and could help in limiting
the exposure. If a building has a parking garage, vehicles
that could carry potential hazards e.g. large amount of
explosives, may have easy access to the building causing
increased potential exposure, on the other hand if there is
no parking garage the exposure may be limited to what
one can carry. Analysis of the security system is therefore
necessary.
Brown and Lowe (2003) suggest an evaluation of the
aggressor and they state that terrorism attacks are likely to
be conducted because the aggressors seek e.g. publicity for
their cause, monetary gain or political gain through their
actions. Richards (2008) lists the reasons for arson as
vandalism, excitement, revenge, crime concealment, profit
and extremist beliefs. Brown and Lowe (2003) point out
the significance of understanding who the people are that
want to cause harm, their means and resources. All this
information provides input to be able to determine what
the relevant antagonistic scenarios are that could occur.Interviews
The conclusions and results from the interviews are given
in full in Nilsson and van Hees (2012) and are, therefore
only, summarized below. The interviews focused on ques-
tions related to the first framework for the method, i.e.
“Assets worth to preserve” (called assets further on),
“Protection objectives”, “Exposure analysis” and “Fire sce-
narios”, for further information see Nilsson et al. (2012).
When conducting the interviews and visiting the specific
building it became clear that to be able to do an analysis
of such a complex building, the method needs to be sim-
ple enough so that the user is able to identify scenarios to
be analyzed during a site visit.
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The interviewees were of the opinion that the highest
priority in terms of fire safety should be given to life
safety and the second most important to protect was
functions deemed societally important, in this case infra-
structural functions within the building. Within the building
of concern there were many other functions, but the main
focus of the interviewees was aimed towards the core
functions of the building, in this case infrastructure func-
tions (transport center). Therefore the determination of
building core functions needs to be part of the method,
which is also pointed out by Brown and Lowe (2003). In
order to facilitate continuity of such functions a variety of
support systems are needed, examples given were electricity,
control rooms, telecommunications, physical infrastructure
etc. An example was given where a fire damaged a cable
used for telecommunications, and caused interruption to
municipality functions. Another area that the interviewees
focused on was areas or functions needed to be able to
handle an ongoing incident, such as dispatch centrals etc.
During the interviews it became clear that stakeholders
who took part in the interviews did not have a clear opinion
about protection objectives. The protection objectives were
of the form “no one is supposed to get hurt”, “we do not
allow any interruption to our services” etc. Additionally,
during the interviews the stakeholders raised questions
showing that they started to consider these issues more
seriously and realized that protection objectives need to
be firm and measureable. Further, they had a sense for
possible make-up in case there was to be loss of a function
but the procedures and potential for make-up was not
formalized.
Exposures
The interviewees associated areas with high occupant
density to be weak points of the building, they also consid-
ered areas where there are large amounts of combustible
or flammable materials together with areas where vehicles
have access and where the fire intensity can be large to be
of importance. Another exposure that was brought up by
the interviewees was areas in which people (i.e. the general
population) have easy access and can prepare an antagon-
istic attack without anyone noticing, i.e. where the security
was considered to be poor.
Management and multi-tenant issues
Most interviewees stated that their main protective mea-
sures against fire and antagonistic attacks are the emergency
management plans and action plans put in place in case of
an accident. These plans do not generally consider how to
address the fire itself but rather how to evacuate the
premises or how to act upon seeing a suspicious bag that
may contain explosives or how to coordinate efforts with
the fire rescue service. Not all the interviewees had theirown plans and none of the interviewees were aware of
what plans their neighbor had, i.e. there is no holistic view
from the building management. Management and action
plans will of course have an effect on the scenario and the
method needs to be flexible enough to account for that.
A problem that some interviewees raised was that the
tenants within the building had a very different view on
what level of fire safety should be achieved and none of the
tenants had made an assessment on how other businesses
within the building may be exposing their own business.
Fire protection systems
During the interviews there were indications that the
landlord was not fully aware of how the fire protection
systems within the building was supposed to work, e.g.
whether there was a programmed delay from detection
to sounding the evacuation alarm. There were also
indications that the sprinkler system was not maintained
properly. Further the tenants were not aware of the limita-
tions of the protection systems, in terms of storage heights
etc., which may result in storage configurations or occu-
pancies exceeding the design limits of the suppression
systems. This again reinforces the need to analyze a
scenario in which active fire protection systems fail. Further,
in one fire case, the fire compartmentation did not fulfill
its task and extensive smoke spread occurred, hence the
method not only should consider active fire protection
systems, but, needs to evaluate deficiencies in, and the
reliability of, passive protection systems as well.
Rescue service
During the interviews with the rescue service they stated
that there is often too high an expectation on what the
rescue service can achieve. As examples of such expecta-
tions were given the ability to control and handle technical
systems as well as the belief that the rescue service can
fight a fire with higher heat release rate than they actually
are able to. Another issue that they raised was that their
access routes often collide with evacuation routes, making
it harder for them to undertake a rescue operation.
Antagonism
When the interviewees were asked what kind of antagon-
istic threats they could imagine happening, the general
opinion was that this is highly dependent upon what the
aggressor wants to achieve and the aggressor’s imagination,
indicating the need for aggressor evaluation. One interest-
ing antagonistic exposure that was raised was the fact that
there was an action plan in place stating that if a vehicle
receives a bomb threat, and there are limited means to
evacuate the vehicle at its current location, the vehicle
should be brought into the multifunctional building for
evacuation. This action plan results in the fact that the
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Discussion and summary of the problem identification
In the following section, remarks and thoughts are discussed
on some areas identified in the literature review and
during the interviews. The issues raised during the
interviews are dependent upon the interviewees and the
choice of building. The results from the interviews, how-
ever, have been generalized to be applicable to multifunc-
tional buildings in general. The interviews in combination
with the literature review helped to make sure that import-
ant issues are identified and that the risk of excluding
important issues is minimized. In the next section a
summary of identified problems is given.
Discussion regarding the problem identification
The large number of stakeholders within a multifunctional
building present challenges as discussed above, e.g. many
different protection objectives and goals for the fire safety,
the stakeholders do not “know” each other etc. Even
though not explicitly identified within the literature review
or interviews it is probable that the stakeholders will have
different financial prerequisites influencing their goals
with regards to fire safety and their ability to achieve those
goals. Further, different stakeholders will also have different
exposures from antagonistic threats; some will be more
exposed than others. Even though an antagonistic exposure
may not exist against an important function there might
still be risk of exposure due to the fact that a neighbor
could potentially be exposed. The number of stakeholders
presents challenges as identified above and the method
needs to be able to handle these challenges and work
despite these difficulties.
The number of fire protection systems within a multi-
functional building can be large due to the required
flexibility of the building, e.g. large open spaces, varying
occupancies, etc. If these systems are integrated with each
other, say dependent upon electricity or smoke detector
activation there is a risk of common-cause failure (CCF),
i.e. a single fault disabling several protection systems
(Lundin 2005). This is an aspect that needs to be covered
in the method. However, there may be systems that are
considered not to be integrated with each other, e.g. if
redundancy is provided for electricity by emergency power
to minimize the probability of CCF. Emergency electrical
power had been provided in the WTC to minimize the
risk of a CCF, however the initiating event impaired both
the normal and emergency power systems (Isner and
Klem 1993). This illustrates that there is still a probability
for CCF’s since there is dependency upon electricity even
though redundancy was provided to minimize the prob-
ability of a CCF. This illustrates the potential for increased
probability of a CCF when the initiating event is moresevere and widespread, in the described case for instance,
a bomb. This implies that systems considered not to be
integrated may need to be considered as integrated
depending on the scenario.
The need for evaluation of an aggressor when considering
antagonistic attacks was pointed out both in the literature
review and during the interviews. Such an evaluation
should be conducted as part of the analysis, however it is
clear that a continuous evaluation and external environ-
ment monitoring will be necessary during the life time of
the building due to changing circumstances.
The development process during the interviews, e.g.
stakeholders realizing that protection objectives need to
be firm and measurable, indicates the need for the stake-
holders to be part of an evaluation process. Just by
performing an evaluation, the fire safety level will increase
due to raised awareness. The large number of stakeholders
in a multifunctional building means that it is important to
determine which stakeholders should be present in order
to make the evaluation process effective.
The interviewees divided the weak points into two
main categories, areas with high occupant density and
areas with high fire severity or high probability of fire
ocurring. In the first framework these can be divided
into two separate issues, a large amount of people is an
asset while as fire severity or risk of fire is an exposure.
The exposure needs to be considered in the light of the
asset, there is no point in analyzing a fire if it is not
exposing the asset. Therefore the initial assumption, in
the first framework, that the analysis should have its
starting point in the asset is still valid. Further the issue
with neighbors becoming exposure risks needs to be
covered in the exposure analysis and the method needs
to make sure that this is considered, as the interviews
indicated that this is not the case today.
In general the interviewees deemed electrical appliances
rooms, telecommunication rooms, computer rooms etc.
important for continuity of functions. These areas are very
sensitive to fire damage, especially smoke and there is a
need to investigate efficient protection options for these
areas. This might include clean agent extinguishing systems
(FM Global 2010), hypoxic air-venting systems (BSI 2011,
VdS 2007, Nilsson and van Hees 2013) and the like.
The uncertainties in what the rescue service can
achieve in the case of an accident indicates that the
efforts made by the fire rescue service should not be
taken into account when evaluating or designing a multi-
functional building, at least not in Sweden with the
resources the fire rescue service has there. However
the fire rescue service may be able to help with
management, communication, coordination etc. during an
incident. This however requires planning and that the fire
rescue service is included in the emergency management
plans for the facility.
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consider
In Table 1 below the identified problems that need to be
accounted for in the method are summarized. It should be
noted that these problems are in addition to or of greater
importance than when evaluating or designing a building
not considering antagonistic attacks or multifunctionality
such as when using general strategies as described in
guidelines from SFPE (2006, 2007).
Method for selection and evaluation of fire
related scenarios
The overall method for selection and evaluation of fire
related scenarios is shown in Figure 2. Due to the fact
that the main purpose of the method is to evaluate
existing buildings and that there is often limited time
available to get access to the building, stakeholders etc.
the method needs to be fairly easy and straightforward.
In practice, during a site visit, there is a need to be able
to identify how a scenario may develop, i.e. qualitatively
describe the scenario, and later in the process quantify
that scenario. Given the possible amount of scenariosTable 1 Problems to consider in the method
Aspect that needs to be considered/addressed in the method
Flexibility so that a large variety of protection objectives can be addressed
Large number of stakeholders
Stakeholders with a high exposure to antagonistic attacks (exposing less exp
The initiating event might impair both passive and active fire safety features
Common-cause failure due to large number of protection systems and incre
common-cause failure due to larger initiating event.
A lot of different functions provided, however not all are of main concern an
need to be determined
The fire severity, fire development or growth rate might be higher than wha
(including what protection systems are designed for)
Support systems that are important for functions and fire safety features
Domino effects (e.g. fire following explosion)
Location of fire (critical locations, e.g. sensitive areas, smaller fires where fire p
the protection objective)
Security features (surveillance, access control, easy access areas etc.)
How to determine relevant antagonistic attacks (both large scale and small a
First priority should be life safety then the core function of the building
Core functions of the building and relevant stakeholders need to be determi
Areas or functions needed to handle an ongoing event need to be analyzed
Guidance on firm and measurable protection objectives
Flexibility to take into account emergency management plans and action pla
Higher tendency for failure of protection system due to maintenance issues
Passive protection might be inadequate due to maintenance problems
External exposures such as a bomb threated vehicle brought into the buildin
Method needs to be simple enough to identify and determine scenarios to band the many different ways these can develop it would not
be feasible to identify all possible scenario developments
during a site visit. Therefore it was chosen to base the
method upon scenario analysis choosing a worst-credible
case for every scenario to be analyzed. A scenario chosen
this way will also cover a range of other possible scenario
developments due to the fact that such a scenario is more
challenging than the majority of other possible scenarios.
With scenario analysis uncertainties are handled by
choosing ‘the worst possible conditions that could rea-
sonably be expected’ (Paté-Cornell 1996), i.e. choosing
conservative values, which is what Paté-Cornell (1996)
refers to as Level 2 when treating uncertainties. Level 2
implies that uncertainties for different parameters, such
as heat release rate etc., are handled by choosing values
that are judged to be on the conservative side, i.e. based
on the current knowledge more severe values are
thought to be unlikely. The benefit with using scenario
analysis is that it is a simple approach and it is transparent,
it is known what the scenarios are that have been designed
and accounted for. The method outlined in this paper
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Figure 2 Overview of method for development and evaluation of fire scenarios in multifunctional buildings. (WCC =Worst credible
consequence, AASW = All active systems working, OASI = One active system impaired, AS = Active system).
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Paté-Cornell (1996)) and the first analyses in the method
are conducted with scenario analysis.
One disadvantage with treating uncertainties by choosing
conservative values is the matter of not knowing how
conservative the chosen values are, i.e. the uncertainties
are not quantified and the risk is unknown (Paté-Cornell
1996). Therefore treating uncertainties this way presents
shortcomings in the risk management phase when the
risks cannot be reduced enough at low costs and when
under budget restraints (Paté-Cornell 1996). Since the risk
is not quantified there is no way to determine cost effective
mitigating measures or to prioritize what scenarios to
address. Due to these reasons there is a possibility that
the first scenario analyses, i.e. the level 2 analyses, do not
give satisfactory results, i.e. it cannot be concluded that
the situation is acceptable. If this is the case the
method will recommend that a Quantitative Risk
Assessment (QRA) be performed. QRA corresponds to
what Paté-Cornell (1996) classifies as Level 4 regardingthe treating of uncertainties. The reasoning behind this
approach is that it is ineffective, unpractical and time
consuming to perform a full QRA if it is not warranted
and sufficient information can be obtained using simpler
methods.
Determine prerequisites
The first step in the evaluation process is to determine the
prerequisites for the evaluation. In order to determine
what is supposed to be analyzed, it is important to deter-
mine the core functions of the building so that the efforts
and resources are allocated for evaluating the fire safety
according to the level of importance of these functions. If
for example the core functions of the building are infra-
structure and municipality functions and there are large
number of visitors, the efforts should be directed towards
maintaining those functions and ensuring life safety in case
of fire. Less important functions in the building such as
smaller shops, restaurants etc. should not be given the same
attention since it does not fall within the core functions of
Table 3 Examples of stakeholders
Stakeholders
Primary Indirect
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ered as potential exposures to the core functions. Once the
core functions have been determined, relevant stakeholders
associated with these functions can also be determined.
There may also be other indirect stakeholders that have a
vested interest in the building’s safety, such as authorities,
that need to take part in the evaluation. Tables 2 and 3 can
be used for guidance on finding core functions and relevant
stakeholders. The stakeholders are of great importance for
the further evaluation since they need to provide a lot of
information on how the functions of the building are
provided. The possible stakeholders are mainly obtained
from Brown and Lowe (2003) and SFPE (2006) but have
been divided into primary and indirect stakeholders. The
indirect stakeholders might have information giving value
to the analysis, e.g. the police with regards to recent antag-
onistic threats in the area or the fire brigade giving input on
how they may intervene in case of fire.
When determining the prerequisites for the evaluation,
building and occupant characteristics must also be
determined (Nilsson et al. 2012). The characteristics of
the occupants within the building as well as the buildings
functional, geometric and operational characteristics will
be the basis for developing the fire related scenarios.
Examples of these factors include, but are not limited to,
spatial connection and/or separation between fire com-
partments, the flow of people at the time of building use,
the evacuation routes, issues with regards to the variety of
business types and hours, the management form and
responsibilities among different tenants, emergency action
plan and evacuation guidance depending on tenants and
floors, mutual communication between each tenant and
the emergency operation center etc. Other issues that
may affect the evaluation include, but are not limited to,
property location, utilities, applicable regulations etc.
Assets
The next step in the method for developing fire scenarios is
to determine the assets that need to be protected. An asset
is a resource requiring protection (Brown and Lowe 2003)









Otherable to determine the relevant assets, input is needed from
the stakeholders (determined in the previous step). During
the interviews it was found that the discussion itself is a
useful way of determining assets and such a discussion
could be a helpful tool in an evaluation process. The
relevant assets need to be determined based upon the core
functions of the building so that the evaluation is focused
based on the level of importance. For the purpose of this
method assets have been divided into four main categories:
life safety; property; environmental and functions, based
upon the work in Nilsson et al. (2012). To provide guidance
in finding relevant assets, Table 4 may be used.
The assets life safety, property and environment are
generally fairly straightforward as opposed to what the
functions might be. Providing a main function, such as
train transport, might be highly dependent upon other
functions supporting the main function, e.g. electricity,
tracks, telecommunications etc. These supporting functions
or ‘support systems’, need to be determined. Brown and
Lowe (2003) suggest a two-step method, the first step is to
define and understand the main function of interest
and then identify the building infrastructure. This way,
vulnerabilities are identified and focus is put on what a
building does, how this is achieved and how various
threats may affect the building (Brown and Lowe 2003).
By using this approach focus is given to the support
systems that were deemed important during the inter-
views. Using the asset evaluation form in Table 5 guidance
is given to find different support systems. Further, to
address the importance of functions that is needed to
handle an ongoing incident, these functions have been
listed in Table 4. Such functions may be control rooms,
communication centrals or actual protection systems. Due
to the determined importance and proneness to loss of
protection systems in some scenarios a form for evaluating
active fire protection systems has been developed, this is
found in Table 6, and the usage of this form is discussed
further under the section Quantification of scenarios.
As noted in Nilsson et al. (2012) it should also be con-
sidered that the loss of property or environmental
Table 4 Examples of assets
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Naturally if a building is lost it will be unavailable to
provide its functions and authorities may forbid operation
if functions needed to ensure environmental control,
required by law, have been lost.
Protection objectives and associated damage criteria
Protection objectives need to be developed for the assets
and will vary depending on the asset. Some protection
objectives might be governed by legislation, e.g. lifesafety and environmental. Most building codes have a
life safety protection objective stating something like “in
case of fire, occupants should be able to leave the build-
ing in reasonable safety or the risk to occupants should
be acceptably low”, for examples refer to NFPA (2012),
Swedish National Board of Housing, Building and Planning
(2011a) and BSI (2001). However, this protection objective
is quite vague, a more precise protection objective for life
safety may be that no people should die in case of fire in
the building. However such a protection objective may not
be achievable in every scenario and it may be necessary to
develop more sophisticated protection objectives such as
acceptable number of injured people or fatalities depending
on the severity of the scenario. Life safety protection objec-
tives may also, for example, be expressed as acceptable
individual and societal risk. In order to be able to assess
whether the protection objective is achieved or not,
damage criterion associated with the protection objective
needs to be developed, i.e. at what measureable impact is
the protection objective not met. Most building codes have
a set of damage criteria associated with life safety, one
example is visibility of not less than 10 m, for example refer
to BSI (2004) and Swedish National Board of Housing,
Building and Planning (2011b). The International Code
Council (ICC) (2011) has established protection objectives
in the form of different acceptable impacts where for
example, acceptable structural damage has been qualitatively
described, such as “moderate structural damage, which is
repairable”. Such descriptions of protection objectives and
associated damage criteria might be useful and the code is
recommended for input and further guidance. However
the damage criterion needs to be further quantified in
these cases, than is done in the code, and in terms of ‘at
what impact’ the protection objective is not met, e.g. at
what pressure or force is the structure damaged. Depending
on the scenario, the damage criterion may differ, e.g. in
case of an explosion an acceptable level of elevated
pressures may be needed.
Property damage objectives might be expressed as
acceptable monetary value of loss or as an acceptable
damage area and environmental objectives are typically
defined in terms of contamination of a medium (Nilsson
et al. 2012). Again a damage criterion need to be associated
with the protection objective in order to determine at
what exposure level from the fire is the protection objective
not met.
The protection objectives for functions however, may
be more difficult to determine. Loss of functions is often
associated with interruption to services, e.g. a business
or important societal function. As stated above support
systems may be of great importance and important
support systems may also need protection objectives and
associated damage criteria in order to be able to ascertain
the overall protection objective for the determined asset.
Table 5 Asset evaluation form with examples
Asset evaluation form Support systemsa
Asset Electricity
Switchgear/ transformer Cables Heat Cooling Tele-comm.
Data system X X
Prot. Obj. RTO 8 h Max 4 h outage due to 4 h reboot …
Damage Criteria 200°C on critical cables, smoke in both
server rooms
360°C on linings …
Construction & HVAC 3 h fire rated, separate vent sys, holes
in wall
2 gypsum on metal studs,
ventilation direct to outside
…
Occupancy Comp. equip, regular comb. …
Exposure Electrical fault, hot work, targeted attack
with flam liq
…
Protection/ Security Clean agent extinguishing sys., steel door,
access control, back-up of data off site
…
Possible Scenarios Fire in comp. equip., fire in reg. comb.,
flam liq fire in both server rooms
(Antagonistic)
…
aNot all possible support systems are listed, just examples, others might include but is not limited to, server room, computer room, control room, water,
evacuation alarm, structural frame, ventilation, gas, sewer, personnel, customers etc.
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ate protection objectives and to identify the different
support systems that are important. In order to facilitate
this process the stakeholders need to be interviewed to
gain information, also Table 5 can be used for guidance to
help find critical support systems. A structured way of
determining protection objectives for functions is again to
focus on core functions and it is essential to determine
how the facility fits into the “big picture”, i.e. how critical
the facility is to the organization’s operation, after that
protection objectives can be established (SFPE 2006). One
suitable way of establishing the objectives is to conduct a
business impact analysis (BIA), often done for IT systems
(Bowen et al. 2006) and as recommended in NFPA 1600
“Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and
Business Continuity Programs” (NFPA 2013). A BIA
identifies a system’s critical resources, each resource is then




Isolation (from event) Separate building
Exposure Closing valve as part of scenario
Function (adequacy) Designed for the occupancy
Human action None needed, automatic …
Reliability/ Maintenance Maintenance according to standard …
Evacuation alarm
Isolation (from event) …
aThere could be far more support systems than listed here, e.g. control panels, extinthe resource could be withheld before an unacceptable im-
pact is experienced (Bowen et al. 2006). The time identified
is maximum allowable outage (MAO) and the balancing
point between MAO and the cost for recovery establishes
the Recovery Time Objective (RTO). This method can be
applied to multifunctional buildings as well by establishing
the impact on a function if loss occurs of a component or
support system. Recovery strategies together with protec-
tion should then result in a downtime less than the RTO.
It might also be beneficial to include loss of customers due
to prolonged downtime in this analysis. Damage criteria
depend on the support systems or resources required to
maintain the functions and could include equipment,
personnel etc. Business continuity plans and possible
make-up at other locations can be incorporated into this
analysis. To determine opportunities such as make-up and
to establish business continuity plans, standards for busi-
ness continuity planning and emergency managementSupport systemsa





guishing agents, cooling, personnel etc.
Nilsson et al. Fire Science Reviews 2013, 2:3 Page 13 of 20
http://www.firesciencereviews.com/content/2/1/3such as NFPA 1600 (NFPA 2013) can be utilized. If there
is make-up available at other locations this might allow
for a longer RTO.
Virtually any protection objective can be chosen for
any asset, hence the method fulfills the requirement of
being able to address a large variety of protection objectives.
Further this step also focuses on support systems and
therefore also addresses the issue of identifying critical fire
locations. In Table 5 examples are given of protection
objectives as well as associated damage criteria.
Exposure analysis
The next step in the method is to determine the hazards/
threats that could pose a risk that the protection objectives
are not met for the specified assets and associated support
systems. This is referred to as an exposure analysis, some-
times called hazard identification. A hazard is a condi-
tion or physical situation with a potential to cause harm
(SFPE 2006). A physical hazard might be flammable liq-
uids or combustibles, but if a hazard relates to a person or
group it will normally be defined in terms of state of
knowledge, attitude or belief that is characterized as hu-
man action within an event (Nilsson et al. 2012). Some-
times the physical hazard might be separated from the
asset, e.g. by physical separation, fire compartmentation
or by active fire protection systems etc. Therefore it is es-
sential to evaluate how the asset is protected from any
hazards. To facilitate this, the asset evaluation form can
be used as a checklist, see Table 5. The checklist con-
tains an evaluation of the construction, i.e. is it fire
rated, are penetrations sealed etc. Further it contains an
evaluation of the occupancy and the associated hazards
that comes as a natural consequence of the occupancy,
the protection and security features are also evaluated.
Hence, the asset evaluation form addresses the identified
issue with for example maintenance of fire separation not
being adequate and other potential deficiencies in construc-
tion features as well as evaluation of security features miti-
gating the exposures.
Exposures are divided into two main types based on the
work by Nilsson et al. (2012), accidental/natural exposures
and antagonistic exposures. If the exposure is actually
endangering the asset, needs to be determined based upon
location of the asset in relation to the exposure, hence the
construction features and physical separation in the asset
evaluation form, Table 5, need to be considered. Based on
the exposures identified according to the sections below
possible, scenarios can be added to Table 5.
Accidental/natural exposures
Accidental/natural exposures are exposures causing an
accidental fire, i.e. without intention. An example can be
a fire in regular combustible material that was ignited by
an electrical fault or through hot work operations, inthis case the exposures being the combustible material
and the ignition source. Accidental/natural exposures
that present an exposure to life safety are generally
considered by the building code. For multifunctional
buildings however, a larger focus on the functions is
needed, which follows from the determined assets and
their support systems (Nilsson et al. 2012). It is important
not to overlook any exposures that may expose the assets
(including their support systems), there may be what
could generally be considered a small exposure, say a
small fire in an electrical room, that may not generally be
analyzed. However this smaller fire might cause the dam-
age criterion for an asset or support system to be exceeded
hence the protection objective may be exceeded. It is
therefore important to consider the exposure in relation
to the damage criterion and the protection objective, if
these are reflecting a high proneness to fire damage these
small exposures need to be considered as well. For
accidental/natural exposures the method for hazard
identification in the SFPE engineering guide has been
adapted and a more detailed description can be found
in that guide (SFPE 2006). Also Table 7 can be used for
guidance in finding exposures. The accidental/natural
exposures have also been divided into Internal and
External exposures just to raise the awareness that there
may be exposures further away from the building itself
endangering the protection objectives, one example could
be a fire at a neighbor, a gas explosion further away or a
train on fire entering the building.
Antagonistic exposures
As determined by the literature review and the interviews
the way an antagonistic attack may develop can vary
considerably and the literature gives a broad list of
possible attacks. Examples from Brown and Lowe (2003)
and Thompson and Bank (2007) include, explosion, arson,
fire as a secondary effect to blast, attacks on load-bearing
members, bypassing fire protection, attacks against evacu-
ation routes to slow down evacuation etc.
Additionally, with antagonistic attacks the possibility
that the attack is targeted against something else needs
to be considered, there may be tenants within the building
having a more severe antagonistic threat against them
than the core functions considered. One example was
given during the interviews where the procedure was to
transport a bomb-threatened vehicle (say train, ferry,
airplane) into the multifunctional building in order to
evacuate the vehicle. This due to the fact that provisions
in the multifunctional building made evacuation quicker.
The exposure from antagonistic events is a combination
of many factors. Brown and Lowe (2003) suggest an
approach where the existence of a threat, the capability of
the aggressor, history of attacks and intentions of the
aggressor is evaluated in order to give guidance regarding
Table 7 Examples of accidental/natural exposures
Accidental/Natural exposure
Internal External
Heat sources Fuel sources Type
Smoking Regular combustibles Explosion
Hot Work Flam liquids External fire (facade)
Heating equipment Plastics Fire at neighbor
Cooking appliances Room linings Vehicle fire
Tools Concealed comb spaces Other
Machinery Proximity to heat source
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threats and security to this as well and the approach given
in Nilsson et al. (2012) is chosen in this method for evalu-
ating the exposure from antagonistic threats. In order to
be able to determine the existence and history of an ex-
posure, input from different stakeholders is needed. Ten-
ants and owners may know if they have experienced
attacks before and the police or fire department may have
information on vandalism in the area etc. The intentions
to conduct an antagonistic attack will give one piece of in-
formation on how the attack may be conducted. Adding
the factor of security will give guidance on the magnitude
of the scenario as well, e.g. if a car cannot enter the build-
ing the amount of explosives or accelerants that can be
brought into the building may be limited and the exposure
less severe. Table 8 presents steps to go through to deter-
mine antagonistic exposures. It should be noted that the
table is not conclusive and the process is somewhat itera-
tive; sometimes starting with the aggressor and its capabil-
ities, sometimes with possible scenarios and then
determine who has that capability.
It needs to be recognized that antagonistic attacks may
be more severe and targeted as opposed to accidental/
natural exposures. A well-informed attacker may know
exactly where to strike to achieve the intention of theTable 8 Antagonistic exposures
Step Examples of aspects to consider
Existence Who is hostile to the assets, organization etc. and might
Capability What methods, material, means etc. do the aggressors h
History What has the aggressors done in the past? Where have
Intention What do the aggressor hope to achieve? (vandalism, po
Threats Explosion (e.g. by stationary vehicle, moving vehicle, ma
remotely via projectile), attacks on electrical supply, fire
on evacuation routs and stairs) etc.
Security Surveillance, access limitation, site perimeter, lighting, seattack, therefore focus need to be put on the assets when
determining exposures. When considering the severity
of an attack, explosives, flammable liquids etc. has the
potential for a rapid development of a scenario with po-
tential for domino effects such as a fire followed by an
explosion. Security features, i.e. how much hazardous
material can be transported into the area of interest, give
some guidance on severity as do the evaluation of the
aggressor’s capability. However, there is a clear possibil-
ity for extreme events, i.e. events exceeding the design
level event (Bukowski 2006), when considering antagon-
istic attacks. Brown and Lowe (2003), however, state that
the more secure a building is and the better designed it
is to resist an antagonistic threat, not only will the dam-
age probably be less severe, but the building is also less
likely to be picked as a target. The procedure described
above and in Table 8 gives guidance on what possible
exposures may be present. Whether the building should
be designed to resist those exposures or not is up to the
relevant stakeholders.
Selection of scenarios to analyze and qualitative
description
Based on the determined assets, the protection objec-
tives and the exposure analysis, fire related scenarios
challenging the protection objectives have been identi-
fied and listed in the asset evaluation form (Table 5). At
this stage the scenarios have not been quantified but are
rather described with qualitative characteristics such as
initiating event, fire spread to secondary rooms, etc. An
example would be “An explosion in the mail room, tear-
ing down the fire wall and damaging sprinkler piping
causing extensive fire spread to the adjacent computer
room”. In the qualitative description of the scenario it is
important to list possible domino effects, such as a fire
following an explosion or damage to fire walls resulting
in larger damaged areas. The possibilities of domino ef-
fects need to be recognized at this early stage and later
quantified during the quantification of the scenario to
determine if such a scenario is possible and if it will de-
velop as first described qualitatively. Further variation in
time and room need to be considered, if e.g. life safety isthey be present at the location?
ave? Is the material available at the building or do they need to bring it?
they done it? Is there any history of such events in the area?
litical, excitement etc.)
il, supply, thrown, placed, personnel), arson (e.g. via direct contact or
protection systems (e.g. by-passing, damaged by initiating event, attacks
curity personnel etc.
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density depending on time of the day and location
within the building. The same may also be true for other
protection objectives, e.g. interruption to transportation
facilities may have greater consequences during rush
hours. From the previous steps the identified number of
scenarios are likely to be unmanageable and the scenar-
ios need to be merged into clusters (SFPE 2006). From
each cluster one or more scenarios are chosen for fur-
ther quantification in order to represent the other sce-
narios within the cluster in terms of challenging the
stated protection objectives. Another input on the
choice of scenarios that should be further analyzed and
quantified can be given by listing the scenarios and de-
termine how many assets each scenario threatens. Sce-
narios that pose a threat to several assets may be more
critical to analyze.
Quantification of scenarios
The scenarios chosen for further analysis, in the previ-
ous step, need to be fully quantified, e.g. heat release rate
(HRR), soot production etc. need to be specified. The
process is described in Figure 3 below and is based on
the method presented in Staffansson (2010) and further
details on how to quantify e.g. HRR can be found in this
literature. However factors affecting the scenario need to
be defined and should at least include building, occupants
and fire characteristics (SFPE 2007). In large these factors
have already been determined while using the asset evalu-
ation form presented in Table 5. Occupant characteristics
may not have been determined, however if life safety is to
be evaluated this needs to be done.
The quantification of fire scenarios, and determination
if the protection objectives are met or not, is done in
three steps. The three steps are illustrated in Figure 3
and the complexity of the analysis increases with each
step, if it is necessary to continue to the next step. The
idea is to do an initial screening on whether a detailed
analysis is needed or not and still to some extent include
the probability of failure of active fire protection systems
as this has been identified as important when considering
antagonistic threats. Further, the consequences can be
determined for the specific scenario. The three steps are
scenario based and treat uncertainties on Level 2 according
to Paté-Cornell (1996), i.e. by choosing conservative values.
If the design cannot be deemed to be acceptable after these
three steps a QRA is recommended. QRA is outside the
scope of this article and therefore not discussed further.
Scenarios incorporating antagonistic events have a
potential to be more severe, this has been discussed
above, e.g. flammable liquids present the potential of a
fast developing fire (Richards 2008) and of course an
explosion can create a significant damage. As discussed
in the Literature review section there is a potential thatfire protection systems, both active (sprinkler, self closing
doors etc.) and passive (fire barriers, physical separation etc.)
are inadequate or damaged if the initiating event is severe,
e.g. an explosion. To handle this within the method a
question is always asked whether the passive/active fire
protection is still operational after the initiating event,
see Figure 3. These factors need to be included in the
evaluation and should have its starting point in the
assets as well as the exposure analysis and be qualitatively
described in the previous step. In this step the basis of
quantifying this scenario need to be developed, e.g. what
kind of flammable liquid, amount etc., i.e. input needed in
order to calculate the scenario.
Worst credible consequence (WCC)
The worst credible consequence (WCC) scenario is the
first step in evaluating a scenario. It considers the scenario
when all active fire protection systems are impaired.
Active fire protection systems can be active fire suppression
systems such as sprinklers, evacuation alarm, self closing
doors activated by smoke detection etc. This scenario has
similarities with maximum foreseeable loss or estimated
maximum loss within the insurance industry. However, it
should be pointed out that different insurance companies
have different definitions, some assumes that fire walls are
not breeched and others require a special fire wall or
physical separation if it should be assumed to limit the fire
damage. The benefit of analyzing this scenario is that it
provides information to whether active fire protection
systems are needed to meet the protection objectives. If
the protection objectives are met without any active fire
protection system there is no need to conduct any further
analysis of the scenario. Further, if protection objectives
are met, there is no need to analyze impairment of the fire
protection systems due to any reason (as part of antagon-
istic attack or common failures), hence there is no need to
analyze the availability and reliability of the systems.
Depending on the initiating event impairment of passive
fire protection may also occur, especially when considering
antagonistic attacks, e.g. fire walls may be damaged,
structural fire protection may be damaged or evacuation
routes may be blocked as recognized in the literature
review. This is considered in the second box in Figure 3.
All active systems working (AASW)
The next step in the method is to evaluate the scenario
with all active fire protection systems operational, i.e.
the active systems are available at the time when the
initiating event occurs and continue to operate during
the fire scenario, if the system is not physically damaged
by the initiating event. For a system to be available during
the scenario means e.g. that for a sprinkler system the
pump is in automatic and all appropriate valves are
opened etc. However, the initiating event might still cause
Fire Related Scenarios
1. Fire related scenario without active systems, Worst Credible Consequence, WCC 
2. Fire related scenario with All Active Systems Working, AASW


































































Figure 3 Fire related scenario development.
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an explosion tearing down a wall bringing sprinkler pipes
down rendering the system ineffective (Nilsson et al. 2012),
this is what is checked in the second box in Figure 3.
Another example is that the systems are bypassed as a part
of an antagonistic attack or a wall is damaged to a room
protected with hypoxic-airventing as is suitable for some
areas in multifunctional buildings, e.g. electrical rooms
(Nilsson and van Hees 2013). Such considerations are all
addressed in the second box in Figure 3.
If the fire safety systems are not impaired due to the
initiating event, there is still the question whether the
system effectively will control or protect against the
event. How different active systems affect the fire devel-
opment in a building with an occupancy it is designed
for and with a general fire initiation can be found in the
literature (Nystedt 2011, Madrzykowski and Vettori
1992, Evans 1993, Swedish National Board of Housing,
Building and Planning 2011b). However the effectiveness
needs to be determined against the stated protectionobjectives and the anticipated fire hazard the system was
designed for. If the fire hazard for some reason is higher
than what was designed for, e.g. if multiple fires are
started as part of an antagonistic event (Richards 2008) or
if the protection objective concerns e.g. contamination,
then the suppression system might be ineffective (Nilsson
et al. 2012). A fire in a computer room for example may
be adequately controlled by a sprinkler system to not
spread further within the building but the protection
objective for functional performance of the computer
system may be exceeded due to smoke or water damage.
During the interviews a need was identified for flexi-
bility to include how action plans, emergency manage-
ment plans, fire rescue service etc. affect the scenario.
As pointed out by Lundin (2001) the effect of human
interaction during an event is very hard to predict and
model, therefore caution need to be applied. However
there is a flexibility to include any damage mitigating ac-
tions into the method. This can be applied for example,
either by modifying the design fire if there are
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effects of the emergency management plans on evacuation
behavior due to assistance from personnel.
If the protection objectives are not met when all active
systems are working mitigating measures or adjustment
of the protection objectives are needed. This is due to
the fact that the protection objectives are not met in the
most beneficial circumstances for the scenario, and will
therefore never be met unless something is changed.
One could come to the conclusion that other mitigating
measures are needed, the protection objective was set to
high or the scenario considered was to severe, whatever
the cause the process needs to be reevaluated with a
change in some of these factors.
One active system impaired (OASI)
If the protection objectives are met for the scenario
when all active systems are working, there is still a need
to analyze the robustness of the fire safety, i.e. how
dependent is the fulfillment of the protection objectives
upon one single fire safety system. The need for robust-
ness of the fire safety, i.e. to not be fully dependent upon
one system in order to achieve the protection objectives
for a scenario, has been recognized by e.g. Lundin (2005)
the Swedish (Swedish National Board of Housing, Building
and Planning 2011b) and the New Zealand (Department of
Building and Housing 2012) building code as well as in
design fire scenario 8 in NFPA 101 (NFPA 2012).
In Figure 3 the process for developing the scenario with
one active system impaired is described. The scenario
starts with one active system being impaired, e.g. the
sprinkler system is not considered to affect the scenario.
In this case the active system is assumed to be impaired
before the initiating event occurs (the first box of Figure 3)
due to some general failure mode of the active system. A
general failure mode could e.g. be that the pump has been
inadvertently turned off, a valve is closed by accident or
the batteries for starting the engine are empty. This is
assumed in order to account for the inherent probability
of failure of active fire protection systems. However, there
is still the question of whether the initiating event damages
and impairs any other (excluding the already assumed
impaired system) active or passive fire protection system
and this is addressed in the third box of Figure 3.
In the third box of Figure 3 a check is done as to
whether the other active systems and passive systems are
still operational and that they have not been damaged or
disabled as part of the scenario. As an example, in the first
box the sprinkler system is assumed to be impaired due to
empty starting batteries. An initiating event occurs which
is an antagonistic attack including an explosion, in the
third box a check is done and it is concluded that the ex-
plosion damaged the control panel for the evacuation
alarm. Hence the scenario now includes two impairedactive systems, the sprinkler system due to empty batteries
and the evacuation alarm that was damaged by the initiating
explosion. The difference from the AASW scenario is
that the inherent failure probability of active systems is
accounted for in this scenario by assuming impairment
to the sprinkler system before and during the scenario.
If the protection objective is met for the scenario the
process is repeated but with another active system impaired
in the first box in Figure 3, e.g. the smoke management
system (only one active system is assumed to be impaired
due to inherent failure modes at each scenario, i.e. in the
second case for the example above the sprinkler system is
assumed to be working again). This is then repeated so
that all active systems have been impaired once in the first
box in Figure 3.
If the protection objective is not met for any of the
scenarios, with on active system impaired, one needs to
determine whether the likelihood of failure for the system
is acceptable or not. If the likelihood of failure is accept-
able, then continued evaluation is conducted testing with
other active systems impaired. If the likelihood of failure is
unacceptable then mitigating measures, change of scenario
or altering protection objective needs to be considered
(the same that is done when protection objectives are not
met for AASW, see above). Generally, there is an accept-
able probability of failure for an active system and a higher
consequence is probably acceptable in this case meaning
that it may be acceptable that the first stated protection
objective is not met and a larger damage is accepted when
an active system fails.
When all active systems have been assumed to be
impaired in the first box in Figure 3 and all these variations
of the scenario have been evaluated the availability and
reliability of the least reliable active system need to be
analyzed. The likelihood of failure for that system needs
to be determined and if the probability of failure for the
least reliable active system can be accepted, the situation
is acceptable, since this is the highest probability for
failure. If the determined probability is too high the
situation may be unacceptable, however this is unknown
since the protection objective is either met with the
system failing or the probability was earlier determined to
be acceptable. Hence failure of another system at the same
time as the first system is needed in order for the situation
to be unacceptable. At this stage the evaluation process is
starting to become more complex and it is recommended
to perform a full QRA.
An availability and reliability analysis of active protection
systems is needed to assess the likelihood of failure of the
system. Availability refers to if the system is in operational
mode when the fire starts (compare to the first box in
Figure 3), e.g. the system is unavailable if it has inadvert-
ently been left out of service after maintenance (SFPE 2007).
The system reliability on the other hand considers that
Table 9 Attributes considered
Attribute Applicability to evaluation of active protection systems
Function This is to determine if the protection is designed according to the relevant hazard and if it will perform as designed
Human action/performance If human action is needed in order for the system to work there is an uncertainty added due to human error.
Complexity A complex fire protection system increases the probability of error, e.g. if many support systems are needed
for the system to perform as intended, (detector activating, fan for smoke exhaust, inlet air needed at the
same time). Another issue adding to the complexity is the probability of common cause failures, e.g. if power
is lost then the sprinkler system as well as the evacuation alarm is lost. This is addressed in Table 6 by identifying
common support systems for different protection systems.
Reliability This is the probability that the system will fulfill its purpose on demand. This is connected to both the function
(whether it is properly designed) and issues like maintenance. Evaluation of e.g. maintenance needs to be done
and a starting point should be to fulfill relevant standards on maintenance for the considered system.
Vulnerability This attribute describes the conditions for the survival of the system when exposed to internal and external stress.
This is linked to how the system is isolated from the actual event, is it in a separate building etc.
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intended, e.g. if a component is failing during operation or
if the fire hazard for some reason is greater than the de-
sign of the system, say an antagonistic attack. Another
issue is whether the system is affected by the initiating
event or not, as asked in Figure 3, this has mainly to do
with if the system is isolated from the event, e.g. a separate
pump house for the sprinkler pumps and risers presents a
fairly isolated system compared to a sprinkler room within
the building the system is protecting. In order to facilitate
evaluation of an active system for the purpose of this
method Table 6 has been developed.
The categories in Table 6 have been developed based
on the discussion by Lundin (2005) regarding attributes
for defining fire safety. For the purpose of the evaluation
of active systems the relevant attributes are: function;
human action/performance; complexity; reliability; and
vulnerability, these are described in Table 9. The attri-
butes are discussed in detail in Lundin (2005) and are
based on the work done by Meister (1991).
By using Table 6 and addressing the attributes an
assessment can be made of the availability and reliability
of fire safety systems and help in determining likelihood
of failure in order to assess if the likelihood is acceptable
or not.
Once the last box in Figure 2 has been evaluated the
analysis for a scenario is either finished or it has been
determined that a QRA is needed for the scenario. The
process is then repeated for all scenarios chosen in the
step “Selection of scenarios to analyze”. Once this has
been completed the analysis of the building is done.
Future work
The method is still in the developing phase and the
method has not been fully tested in practice yet. This is a
weakness and the next step is to apply the method on an
actual building to test and determine its strengths and
weaknesses. One identified focus area to be evaluated
when applying the method is how well domino effects are
captured within the method or if refinement is needed inthis aspect. Such effects might include multiple events
such as a coordinated attack with for example a fire and
an explosion at different locations but as part of the same
attack.Conclusion
An engineering method for selection and evaluation of fire
related scenarios in multifunctional buildings, considering
antagonistic attacks, has been developed. The method is
based on identified (through literature review and interviews)
important aspects and problems, specific for antagonistic
threats and multifunctional buildings. The specific identi-
fied problems that are taken into account are summarized
in Table 1.
The strength of the method is that there is now a
process available for a systematic evaluation considering
new aspects of fire safety. Further the method is based
on sound principles and there is a clear connection to
both fire safety engineering in the normal (accidental)
case and principles for protection against antagonistic
events. The method is also compatible with standards
on emergency management and business continuity
planning and can e.g. be used in the risk assessment phase
of such standards such as NFPA 1600 (NFPA 2013).
Finally the method treats uncertainties for the scenarios in
a scientifically recognized way, i.e. by choosing conservative
values according to the level 2 approach.Appendix
Terminology
Active fire protection systems, AS: Fire protection system
that needs to activate as a response to fire, e.g. sprinkler
system, evacuation alarm, self closing doors activated by
smoke detector etc.
Antagonistic attack: Manmade attack, against a specific
target to which the aggressor bear hostility, with the
intention to cause harm as a consequence of the attack,
e.g. terrorist attack such as an explosion or arson fire.
Nilsson et al. Fire Science Reviews 2013, 2:3 Page 19 of 20
http://www.firesciencereviews.com/content/2/1/3Security: Security is protection aimed towards limiting
access such as perimeter fencing, CCTV, watch service,
locking etc.
Multifunctional building: One or several connected
buildings hosting several functions (e.g. societal) or
occupancies (e.g. office, restaurant) where the facility
and its functions is one integrated whole. The definition
also includes underground facilities.
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